Richard Abels

STRATEGY AND CAMPAIGNING IN THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES.

INVASION OF HAINAULT, 1184-1185

A CAMPAIGN WITH FEW SIEGES AND NO BATTLES

(Based on John France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000-1300. London: UCL Press, 1999, pp. 97-101, supplemented by J.F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. Trans. S. Willard ad Mrs. R.W. Southern. 2^nd revised ed. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1997.)

Primary source for events: Gislebert of Mons, Chronicon Hanoniense. (Gislebert of Mons was chancellor to Count Baldwin V of Hainault. His account of events is based on first hand knowledge but is biased toward his lord Count Baldwin)

Medieval Hainault and its Neighbors (Count Philip of Flanders also held Artois in 1184)

from Nicholas Hooper & Matthew Bennett, Cambridge Illustrated Atlas. Warfare: The Middle Ages 768-1487. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1996, p. 149.

LEADERS:

Count Baldwin V of Hainault (ruled 1171-95)

vs

Philip of Alsace, Count of Flanders (1168-91); Philip of Heinsburg, Archbishop of Cologne (1167-91); Godfrey III, Duke of Brabant (1142-90), and his son Henry (duke from 1190-1235); and Jacques d’Avesnes, Seigneur de Guise (1168-1191)

MILITARY FORCES

Invasion forces (according to Gislebert of Mons):

A. Philip of Flanders: 500 knights, 1000 mounted sergeants with hauberks;

*40,000 foot-soldiers (see comment below)

B. Archbishop Philip of Cologne: 1,300 knights and “many” mounted sergeants

C. Godfrey of Brabant: 400 knights and *60,000 foot soldiers

Totals: 2,200 knights; 1000+ mounted sergeants; *100,000 foot-soldiers

Defensive forces (according to Gislebert of Mons):

Baldwin V: 1,300 knights (700 vassals, 300 mercenary, 300 allied French) and

*60,000 foot-soldiers (no number given for 1184, but Gislebert states that Hainault’s forces in 1178 and 1181 included 60,000 foot-soldiers). Baldwin bolstered his infantry forces by hiring 3,000 foot sergeants.

Estimate of actual infantry strengths:

The number of knights given by Gislebert is probably reliable; the number of foot-soldiers is grossly exaggerated. We can estimate the number of foot-soldiers, however, by analogy with other medieval forces about which we have administrative records. In 1194, for instance, King Philip Augustus of France could call upon 5,435 foot sergeants, largely from the communes (towns) and ecclesiastical institutions (monasteries and bishoprics) under his lordship. In 1214 Philip could call upon 8,069 foot-soldiers from a much expanded realm that now included Vemandois, Normandy, and Anjou. Flemish infantry strength was probably similar. In the battle of Courtrai in 1302, the Flemings had 8,000-10,000 foot-soldiers. Given that 1184 the kingdom of France and the county of Flanders were far stronger militarily than Brabant, the archbishopric of Cologne, or Hainault, it would be surprising if the allied invasion force in 1184 included more than 10,000 foot-soldiers. Since Gislebert indicates that Baldwin’s forces were smaller, we can estimate that he could call upon 5,000-7,000 foot sergeants.

Estimated totals:

Allied invasion force: 2,200 knights; about an equal number of mounted sergeants; about 10,000 foot soldiers

Hainault’s defensive forces: 1,300 knights; about 5,000-7,000 foot sergeants.

Gravenstein Castle (castles of the medieval counts of Flanders)

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The basic casus belli was a series of territorial disputes and entangling alliances.

1. Baldwin V of Hainault vs. Godfrey III of Brabant.

There was no clearly established boundary between Hainault and Brabant and the holdings of the count and duke interpenetrated each other’s territory. As a result of this, Count Baldwin V of Hainault and his cousin Duke Godfrey III of Brabant constantly bickered over rights to towns and castles along their frontier. Adding to this was a long-running disputed claim to the county of Namur. In 1171 the heirless Henry IV “the Blind”, count of Luxembourg and count of Namur, named Count Baldwin V as heir in Namur. Duke Godfrey III, however, claimed a hereditary right to Namur. In 1183 matters came to a head when Baldwin V fortified the frontier town of Lembeq, which Godfrey regarded as an offensive act.

2. Baldwin V of Hainault vs. Philip, Archbishop of Cologne. Philip, another cousin of Baldwin, was concerned that Baldwin’s control over the county of Namur would threaten the trade route between Cologne and Flanders.

3. Baldwin V of Hainault vs. Count Philip of Flanders. Count Baldwin and Count Philip were not only brothers-in-law both close allies until around 1182. Count Baldwin was not only Count Philip’s brother-in-law, but was also his vassal for the town of Bapaume (near Péronne on the map) which was part of his wife’s dowry. Friendship turned to hostility, however, when Baldwin V switched his support from Count Philip to King Philip Augustus, his son-in-law, during a series of military conflicts between France and Flanders in the late 1170s and early 1180s. (Baldwin’s change of policy was the result a threat by King Philip to renounce his marriage to the Count’s daughter.) Count Philip, in turn, allied himself with Godfrey III of Brabant in an attempt to gain support against King Philip.

As with Godfrey III, the relationship between Count Baldwin and Count Philip was strained by a territorial dispute. Count Philip in 1184 held the cathedral city of Amiens along with the rest of Artois in right of his late wife, the countess of Artois who had died in 1182. Count Baldwin claimed Artois as belonging to Hainault.

NARRATIVE

In the early fall of 1184 Count Philip of Flanders strengthened the defenses and garrisons of his castles along the southern border of Hainault. At the same time, Duke Godfrey III of Brabant and Archbishop Philip of Cologne gathered forces to Hainault’s northeast. On 1 November 1184, the forces of Count Philip of Flanders crossed the border into Hainault and drove north toward the main city of Mons, ravaging the land and burning towns along the way. About the same time Duke Godfrey and Archbishop Philip drove on Mons from the northeast. There strategy was designed to lure away Count Baldwin’s greater vassals by threatening their lands with devastation. It worked in the cases of Jacques d’Avesnes, seigneur de Guise, whose territory bordered on Flanders, and his neighbor Rasse de Gavre, but most of Baldwin’s vassals remained unshaken in their loyalty. And this was the key to Baldwin’s success.

Faced with superior forces, Count Baldwin V chose to rely on what John Gillingham terms the “Vegetian” strategy. He garrisoned his stronger castles, stripped the countryside to supply them, and adopted a scorched earth policy along the path of the invading armies. And he refused to engage in battle. Gislebert of Mons, who as Badlwin’s chancellor ought to have known, has Baldwin explain his military reasoning to the defenders of his castles: “Be brave, be assured, our enemies will go away one day and leave us our lands. After all, they cannot carry them off!” (quoted by France, Western Warfare, p. 99) Meanwhile, Baldwin took the offensive against his disloyal vassal Jacques d’Avesnes by invading his lands and burning 72 of his villages. This served as a reminder to Baldwin’s other castellans that the count could not only reward loyalty but punish treachery. Gislebert relates that as a result of Baldwin’s strategy the forces of Brabant and Cologne faced starvation. When it became clear that Baldwin was resolved to resist to the bitter end, Archbishop Philip, whose participation in the venture was large opportunistic anyway, lost his stomach for the war and sent messengers to Baldwin to initiate a negotiated settlement. The alliance began to unravel.

The allies had not prepared for a long campaign. Rather than bring supplies or establish lines of communication with their nearby home territories, the allies chose to rely on foraging. By doing so, they hoped not only to feed their armies on the cheap and enrich their men with loot but to starve Baldwin’s castle garrisons into submission and persuade his castellans to save their lands by abandoning their lord. Baldwin’s preparations and scorched earth policy, and the loyalty of the Hainault nobility to their count, however, stymied them. Unable to supply themselves from Hainault’s burnt lands and lacking the necessary stockpile of supplies to conduct serious sieges during the winter months, Count Philip, Archbishop Philip, and Duke Godfrey withdrew their hungry troops from Hainault by the end of November.

What now followed was three weeks of raids across the borders, creating a zone of devastation on frontiers between the combatants. Twelve days before Christmas, Count Baldwin and his opponents agreed to suspend hostilities during the holy days. This truce was scheduled to expire on January 13, 1185, but King Philip Augustus stepped in to help negotiate an extension until June 24, 1185. Both sides demobilized. These were not, after all, standing armies but ad hoc forces called in being for the purpose of the campaign. To keep them in being during times of peace was an expenditure that neither Baldwin nor his enemies could afford. Baldwin, after all, not only had borrowed heavily to hire mercenaries but was left with a devastated countryside.

The ethos of the twelfth-century nobility of France and the Lowlands was shaped by the principle of reciprocity. It is therefore not surprising that the truce did not hold and that the party who violated it was Baldwin. Motivated both by the desire for vengeance and for wealth to recover the heavy financial losses he had suffered from the invasion of the previous year, Baldwin raised an army and, around Easter of 1185, renewed the war by marching into Flanders and Brabant. Like the previous year, this invasion was marked by ravaging and pillaging, made more savage by the thirst for revenge. Seeing an opportunity to weaken the powerful Count of Flanders, King Philip Augustus threw in with his father-in-law Baldwin. The king invaded Flanders with an army of 2,000 knights and a large but indeterminate number of foot soldiers. Count Philip of Flanders, forced to defend against Baldwin’s ravaging, was able to mobilize no more than 400 knights to face the king’s army. As was typical for warfare in this period, a major battle did not occur, despite the fact that the two armies were in proximity with one another for three weeks. The threat of battle and the continued ravaging of Baldwin’s forces were sufficient to persuade Count Philip to sue for peace. Count Baldwin, still burning for revenge, was reluctant to accept the offer, but King Philip found the terms too favorable to reject and compelled his ally too make peace with his erstwhile enemy. The war was over. Ironically, when Count Philip of Flanders died on the Third Crusade in 1191, he was succeeded as count by his son-in-law; from 1191 until his death in 1195 Count Baldwin V of Hainault also ruled as Count Baldwin VIII of Flanders.